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NOTES AND COMMENTS
The Effect of Zoning Ordinances
on Churches
For some time, zoning ordinances have
been found necessary in order to relieve the
congestion in the nation's cities and sub-
urbs, and to preserve the value and dignity
of the private home. Through the medium
of the zoning ordinance, business property
has been segregated from residential prop-
erty, and multiple family dwellings from
single family dwellings. It is not difficult to
agree that such things as stores, gasoline
stations and movie theatres are undesirable
in a neighborhood consisting of single fam-
ily dwellings. But difficulty does arise when
a municipality decides to restrict the build-
ing of churches in a residential neighbor-
hood. This is not an easy problem to
resolve, because the advent of a church may
cause a certain amount of inconvenience to
owners of residential property, by way of
noise, increase in traffic congestion, and
property devaluation. On the other hand,
the church has been traditionally identified
with the home, and not with business prop-
erty. The purpose of this note is to examine
the attitudes of the courts towards zoning
ordinances as applied to churches and to
determine to what degree the courts will
allow the building of churches to be regu-
lated. The topic is timely because many of
the cases in this area have been decided in
very recent years. The following items will
be discussed in order: (1) the complete
exclusion of churches from residential dis-
tricts; (2) ordinances qualifiedly permitting
churches in residential districts; (3) regu-
lations with which a church must conform
before being admitted into a residential
district; (4) what is considered to be within
the meaning of the word "church." It is to
be noted that while a church has been held
to be a building set aside primarily for reli-
gious worship,' not every place of religious
assembly has been considered by the courts
to be a church. 2
The Complete Exclusion of Churches
from Residential Districts
According to the weight of authority,
churches cannot be totally excluded by a
zoning ordinance from a municipality or
any of its residential districts.3 Conse-
quently, ordinances which either by their
very terms exclude all churches, 4 or which
1 Portage Township v. Full Salvation Union, 318
Mich. 693, -, 29 N.W.2d 297, 300 (1947); Sex-
ton v. Bates, 17 N.J. Super. 246, -, 85 A.2d 833,
836 (L. 1951), afl'd sub non. Sexton v. County
Ritualarium, 21 N.J. Super. 329, 91 A.2d 162
(App. Div. 1952).
2 Portage Township v. Full Salvation Union, supra
note 1 (religious camp meetings); Sexton v. Bates,
supra note 1 (a mikvah, a building used for ritual-
istic bathing); Coe v. City of Dallas, 266 S.W.2d
181 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953) (property of which
2,400 square feet would be used for healing or
prayer rooms, and only 600 square feet for the
church proper). Under the facts of the latter case
the proposed use would be a nuisance.
3 2 YOKLEY, ZONING LAW AND PRACTICE § 222
(2d ed. 1953); Crolly, Regulation Of The Loca-
tion Of Churches By Municipal Zoning Ordi-
nances, 23 BROOKLYN L. REV. 185, 186 (1957).
See, e.g., North Shore Unitarian Soc'y v.Village of
Plandome, 200 Misc. 524, 109 N.Y.S.2d 803
(Sup. Ct. 1951); Young Israel Organization v.
Dworkin, 105 Ohio App. 89, 133 N.E.2d 174
(1956).
4 North Shore Unitarian Soc'y v. Village of Plan-
by their operation would cause the exclu-
sion of a church,5 have been held invalid
per se or as applied to the particular church
in controversy.
The courts have based their decisions
in this regard on various constitutional
grounds. One reason why they have de-
clared such ordinances invalid is that they
deprive a church of the use of its property
without due process of law.6 To exclude
dome, supra note 3; Ellsworth v. Gercke, 62 Ariz.
198, 156 P.2d 242 (1945); City of Sherman v.
Simms, 143 Tex. 115, 183 S.W.2d 415 (1944).
Ordinances exclude churches when they list a
number of uses that are permitted in the district
without mentioning churches as among these per-
mitted uses. See Ellsworth v. Gercke, supra.
Board of Zoning Appeals v. Decatur, Indiana Co.
of Jehovah's Witnesses, 233 Ind. 83, 117 N.E.2d
115 (1954); Congregation Temple Israel v. City
of Creve Coeur, 320 S.W.2d 451 (Mo. 1959);
State ex rel. Roman Catholic Bishop v. Hill, 59
Nev. 231, 90 P.2d 217 (1939); Young Israel Or-
ganization v. Dworkin, 105 Ohio App. 89, 133
N.E.2d 174 (1956). In the Creve Coeur case there
appears one illustration of how an ordinance could
cause the exclusion of churches, although by its
terms it does not exclude them. There, the ordi-
nance provided that churches, as well as certain
other structures, could not be erected in any dis-
trict without the issuance of a special permit. The
Board of Aldermen could grant the permit, pro-
vided that ten per cent or more of the owners in
the immediate area did not protest against the
building of the church. If such a percentage did
protest, then three-fourths of the Board would
have to approve the application for the permit.
The court held that the state by its zoning act had
granted no authority to cities to prohibit the build-
ing of either churches or schools in residence dis-
tricts. Congregation Temple Israel v. City of
Creve Coeur, supra at 456.
6 Mooney v. Village of Orchard Lake, 333 Mich.
389, 53 N.W.2d 308 (1952); State ex rel. Roman
Catholic Bishop v. Hill, 59 Nev. 231, 90 P.2d 217
(1939); Young Israel Organization v. Dworkin,
105 Ohio App. 89, 133 N.E.2d 174 (1956); City
of Sherman v. Simms, 143 Tex. 115, 183 S.W.2d
415 (1944). See North Shore Unitarian Soc'y v.
Village of Plandome, 200 Misc. 524, 109 N.Y.S.
2d 803 (Sup. Ct. 1951).
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churches from residential districts does not
promote the health, safety, morals and gen-
eral welfare of the community.7 If an ordi-
nance does not promote these ends, it is
arbitrary and unreasonable, 8 and consti-
tutes an unwarranted invasion of one's
property rights.9 Sometimes, the court's
reasoning is impliedly based on the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment, if the ordinance permits without ob-
jection other structures from which flow the
same harms which are sought to be avoided
by excluding churches.10 It has been held,
for example, that it is arbitrary and dis-
criminatory to allow municipal buildings,
public schools, clubhouses, railroad sta-
tions, and post offices and at the same time
not allow churches.1 Another basis for
objection is that such ordinances violate
the mandates of the first amendment as
applied to the states through the fourteenth
amendment, in that they impose an undue
burden on the free exercise of religious
worship. 12 In Board of Zoning Appeals v.
7 North Shore Unitarian Soc'y v. Village of Plan-
dome, 200 Misc. 524, 109 N.Y.S.2d 803 (Sup. Ct.
1951).
s City of Sherman v. Simms, 143 Tex. 115, 183
S.W.2d 415 (1944).
1) See Mooney v. Village of Orchard Lake, 333
Mich. 389, 53 N.W.2d 308 (1952).
10 See North Shore Unitarian Soc'y v. Village of
Plandome, 200 Misc. 524, 109 N.Y.S.2d 803
(Sup. Ct. 1951); Ellsworth v. Gercke, 62 Ariz.
198, 156 P.2d 242 (1945); Note, Churches and
Zoning, 70 HARV. L. REV. 1428, 1434 (1957).
11 North Shore Unitarian Soc'y v. Village of Plan-
dome, supra note 10. Accord, Ellsworth v. Gercke,
supra note 10, at __ 156 P.2d at 244, where the
zoning ordinance excluding churches was held dis-
criminatory in that under the same ordinance "an
owner of property within the district involved may
maintain horses, cows and swine on his premises
and store fertilizer .. "
12 Board of Zoning Appeals v. Decatur, Indiana
Co. of Jehovah's Witnesses, 233 Ind. 83, 117
N.E.2d 115 (1954); City of Sherman v. Simms,
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Decatur Indiana Co. of Jehovah's Wit-
nesses,' 3 the court said:
When, under the facts in this case, the wel-
fare and safety of the people in the neighbor-
hood is placed in the scales of justice on one
side, and the right to freedom of worship
and assembly is placed on the other, the bal-
ance weighs heavily on the side guaranteeing
the right to peaceful assembly and to wor-
ship God according to the dictates of con-
science, regardless of faith or creed.' 4
Important public policy considerations
underlie the attitude with which the major-
ity of courts view the exclusion of churches
from residential districts. The church is the
teacher of morals and the strong supporter
of family life, so that its place is not in the
business districts, but in the places where
people live with their families.' 5 One court
stated its position in this manner:
The place of the church is to be found in
that part of the community where the peo-
ple live. It is to be associated with the home,
its influence is concerned with family life.
It is an institution to which we look for lead-
ership in furtherance of the brotherhood of
man, in molding the moral progress of our
children and sustaining and giving strength
to purity of our family life. To hold that a
church is detrimental to the welfare of the
people is in direct contradiction of historical
truths and evidences a failure to recognize
basic fundamentals of a democratic society.' 6
143 Tex. 115, 183 S.W.2d 415 (1944). See Con-
gregation Temple Israel v. City of Creve Coeur,
320 S.W.2d 451 (Mo. 1959).
13233 Ind. 83, 117 N.E.2d 115 (1954).
14 Id. at __, 117 N.E.2d at 120.
15 See generally Ellsworth v. Gercke, 62 Ariz. 198,
- 156 P.2d 242, 244 (1945); State ex rel.
Tampa, Florida Co. of Jehovah's Witnesses v.
City of Tampa, 48 So.2d 78, 79 (Fla. 1950); State
ex rel. Synod of Ohio v. Joseph, 139 Ohio St. 229,
-, 39 N.E.2d 515, 524 (1942); State ex rel.
Anshe Chesed Congregation v. Bruggemeier, 97
Ohio App. 67, -, 115 N.E.2d 65, 69-70 (1953).
16 State ex rel. Anshe Chesed Congregation v.
Bruggemeier, supra note 15.
On the other hand, the minority view as
evidenced by a few decisions in California
and Florida have upheld the validity of
zoning ordinances which would completely
exclude churches from residential dis-
tricts.' In Corporation of Presiding Bishop
v. City of Porterville,' s an ordinance re-
stricted the district in question to single
family residences. To justify its position
that the ordinance was valid, the court
stated the following:
The provision in the ordinance for a single
family residential area affords an opportu-
nity and inducement for the acquisition and
occupation of private homes where the own-
ers thereof may live in comparative peace,
comfort and quiet. Such a zoning regulation
bears a substantial relation to the public
health, safety, morals and general welfare
because it tends to promote and perpetuate
the American home and protect its civic
and social values. 19
The court went on to say that religious
worship was not being unduly burdened,
since the refusal to allow the church in-
volved to build in the district did not pro-
17 Minney v. City of Azusa, 164 Cal. App.2d 12,
330 P.2d 255 (Dist. Ct. App. 1958), appeal dis-
missed, 359 U.S. 436 (1959); Corporation of Pre-
siding Bishop v. City of Porterville, 90 Cal. App.
2d 656, 203 P.2d 823 (Dist. Ct. App.), appeal
dismissed, 338 U.S. 805 (1949); United Lutheran
Church v. City of Miami Beach, 82 So.2d 880
(Fla. 1955). In State ex rel. Wenatchee Congre-
gation of Jehovah's Witnesses v. City of Wenat-
chee, 50 Wash.2d 378, 312 P.2d 195 (1957), the
court by way of dictum voiced some scepticism
about the majority rule which forbids the complete
exclusion of churches from residential districts as
follows: "The viewpoint of the weight of authority
may be an extreme one. It ignores the basic prem-
ise of modern day zoning legislation which empha-
sizes the best and most reasonable land utilization
possible, considering the best interests of the en-
tire community." Id. at.-, 312 P.2d at 197.
Is 90 Cal. App.2d 656, 203 P.2d 823 (Dist. Ct.
App.), appeal dismissed, 338 U.S. 805 (1949).
19 Id. at __, 203 P.2d at 825.
hibit religious worship to anyone, and since
there was no indication that the church
could not be erected if not built in the
restricted area.20 In Minney v. City of
Azusa,'2 1 the court not only followed the
Porterville case in upholding the validity of
an ordinance which excluded churches from
a residential district 22 but also held that the
church failed to prove that the ordinance,
in allowing libraries, museums, public
schools and municipal buildings at the same
time it was excluding churches, was dis-
criminatory on its face.
23
In United Lutheran Church v. City of
Miami Beach,2 4 the court, in upholding an
ordinance which excluded churches in the
residential district while permitting golf-
courses, playgrounds and municipal build-
ings, expressed itself in this way:
It is commonly known that generally the
activities of the present-day churches are
wide and varied as, indeed, they should be.
The use of church buildings and facilities is
not confined to worship periods on Sunday
and mid-weekly prayer meetings. They are
20 Id. at __, 203 P.2d at 825-26.
21 164 Cal. App.2d 12, 330 P.2d 255 (Dist. Ct.
App. 1958),appeal disnissed, 359 U.S. 436 (1959).
22 Id. at , 330 P.2d at 257.
23 Id. at , 330 P.2d at 261-63. The plaintiff-
church urged that there was also discrimination in
the fact that five other churches had been granted
variances permitting them to build in the residen-
tial district, and that one of them was actually
allowed to locate on the same block on which the
plaintiff now wished to build. The court answered
this objection by saying that the denial of a vari-
ance to some when a variance has been granted to
others does not of itself establish discrimination,
since otherwise, once one variance was granted,
they would always have to be granted, and the
ordinance would then lose all its meaning. Id. at
__ 330 P.2d at 266-67. See Milwaukee Co. of
Jehovah's Witnesses v. Mullen, 214 Ore. 281, __,
330 P.2d 5, 13-15 (1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S.
436 (1959).
24 82 So.2d 880 (Fla. 1955).
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often used as places of instruction and enter-
tainment. We do not frown upon these ac-
tivities; on the contrary we think they should
be promoted and encouraged. But we do not
agree that because of the merits of these
activities it can be said that an infringement
of the constitutional rights of the owner re-
sults if it is not allowed use of the property
for such purposes in the midst of a section
of the city which has been restricted, and
which the [church] ... in this instance knew
had been restricted, primarily to homes to
be occupied by individual families. 25
Ordinances Qualifiedly Permitting. Churches
in Residential Districts
Another type of zoning ordinance with
which churches have come into conflict is
the ordinance which qualifiedly permits
churches in residential districts.26 Such an
ordinance will provide that before the
church can be built on a chosen site in a
residential district, the church authorities
must be granted a permit by the Board of
Zoning Appeals. The Board may in its dis-
cretion refuse to issue the permit, if the
building of a church on the site chosen
would be detrimental to the public wel-
fare.27 The church is not being totally ex-
cluded from the residential district, but it
is only being excluded from a particular
site within the residential district. Conse-
quently, an application can be made for a
permit to build on other sites within the
same district. 2 The ordinance, however,
must contain reasonably definite and uni-
form standards which the Board of Zoning
25 Id. at 882.
26 See Crolly, Regulation Of The Location of
Churches By Municipal Zoning Ordinances, 23
BROOKLYN L. REV. 185, 187-93 (1957).
27 Id. at 188.
28 The Board of Zoning Appeals cannot establish
a policy of never issuing a permit to a church in a
residential district, so that by repeated refusals it
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Appeals can use to determine whether the
granting of the permit to the church will
be detrimental to the general welfare, lest
the church be arbitrarily denied the per-
mit. 29 When the decision of a Board of
Appeals denying a permit is being attacked,
the court must decide whether the reason
for denying the permit bears a substantial
relation to the public welfare. If it does not,
the decision of the Board will be struck
down as arbitrary and capricious, and the
Board will be required by the court to issue
the permit.30
One of the principal reasons why a Board
accomplishes the same result as would an ordi-
nance which completely excludes churches. See
Diocese of Rochester v. Planning Board, 1 N.Y.
2d 508, 523, 136 N.E.2d 827, 835, 154 N.Y.S.2d
849, 860 (1956); Congregation Committee, Jeho-
vah's Witnesses v. City Council, 287 S.W.2d 700,
704 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956). Each time a permit is
denied it must be shown that to issue the permit
would be detrimental to the public welfare. Con-
gregation Committee, Jehovah's Witnesses v. City
Council, supra.
29 Pentecostal Holiness Church v. Dunn, 248 Ala.
314, 27 So.2d 561 (1946).
30 There are two points of view as to who has the
burden of proof when the decision of the Board
denying the permit to the church is being attacked.
Milwaukee Co. of Jehovah's Witnesses v. Mullen,
214 Ore. 281, -, 330 P.2d 5, 11 (1958), cert.
denied, 359 U.S. 436 (1959), states that the bur-
den of proof is on the plaintiff to show that the act
of an administrative agency is arbitrary and that
no different rule applies when the plaintiff happens
to be a church. State ex rel. Synod of Ohio v.
Joseph, 139 Ohio St. 229, -, 39 N.E.2d 515, 523
(1942), on the other hand, represents the point of
view "that the usual presumption of the validity
of the acts of public boards and officials does not
apply to acts involving the forfeiture of an indi-
vidual's rights or the depriving him of the free use
of his property ... [so] that the board of zoning
appeals has the burden of showing reasons suffi-
cient to support its authority in refusing a building
permit." Accord, State ex rel. Wenatchee Congre-
gation of Jehovah's Witnesses v. City of Wenat-
chee, 50 Wash.2d 378, -, 312 P.2d 195, 198
(1957).
of Zoning Appeals may refuse to issue a
permit is that the advent of the church into
the neighborhood will increase traffic haz-
ards and traffic congestion. Many courts
that have dealt with this matter have held
that the traffic problems that might be.
caused by the advent of a new church into
a particular area were an insufficient reason
under the circumstances for denying the
permit.3 1 It may be implied that the courts
in these decisions would not deny that traf-
fic problems could become so severe in a
particular area that a Board of Appeals
would be justified in excluding a church
from that area. One New York decision,
however, seems to set forth a policy against
ever excluding a church because of traffic
congestion. 32 The following were among
the factors which induced the courts to rule
in favor of the churches in the above
cases: 33 (1) the size of the congregation
was small; 34 (2) the streets near the pro-
31 State ex rel. Synod of Ohio v. Joseph, 139 Ohio
St. 229- 39 N.E.2d 515, 523-24 (1942);Young
Israel Organization v. Dworkin, 105 Ohio App.
89, __, 133 N.E.2d 174, 181-82 (1956); Congre-
gation Committee, Jehovah's Witnesses v. City
Council, 287 S.W.2d 700 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956);
State ex rel. Wenatchee Congregation of Jehovah's
Witnesses v. City of Wenatchee, 50 Wash.2d 378,
- 312 P.2d 195, 198-99, (1957); State ex rel.
Howell v. Meador, 109 W. Va. 368, 154 S.E. 876
(1930). Cf. State ex rel. Anshe Chesed Congre-
gation v. Bruggemeier, 97 Ohio App. 67, __, 115
N.E.2d 65, 69 (1953).
32 Diocese of Rochester v. Planning Board, 1 N.Y.
2d 508, 136 N.E.2d 827, 154 N.Y.S.2d 849 (1956).
The court, however, went on to say the following:
"That is not to say that appropriate restrictions
[building restrictions etc.] may never be imposed
with respect to a church and school and accessory
uses, nor is it to say that under no circumstances
may they ever be excluded from designated areas."
Id. at 526, 136 N.E.2d at 837, 154 N.Y.S.2d at
863.
33 See note 31 supra.
34 Congregation Committee, Jehovah's Witnesses
v. City Council, 287 S.W.2d 700, 705 (Tex. Civ.
posed site were wide enough to handle the
extra traffic brought on by the new church; 35
(3) at the time the church held its services
traffic was at a low ebb;36 (4) churches and
other public buildings were already in the
immediate vicinity; 37 (5) off-street parking
was provided for. 38 In some decisions, how-
ever, it has been held that under the cir-
cumstances the traffic problems were suffi-
cient to warrant the denial of a permit. 39
As was said in one of these cases:
[I]f traffic congestion is already a real or
threatening problem near the site where the
congregation desires to build, and the church
would bring to that community enough addi-
tional vehicles to definitely establish conges-
tion at that point, then the Council would be
reasonably warranted, if not duty-bound, to
deny a permit for its erection.
4 0
App. 1956); State ex rel. Howell v. Meador, 109
W. Va. 368, 154 S.E. 876, 877 (1930).
35 State ex rel. Synod of Ohio v. Joseph, 139 Ohio
St. 229, , 39 N.E.2d 515, 524 (1942); Young
Israel Organization v. Dworkin, 105 Ohio App.
89, __, 133 N.E.2d 174, 182 (1956); State ex rel.
Howell v. Meador, 109 W. Va. 368, __, 154 S.E.
876, 877 (1930).
36 State ex rel. Synod of Ohio v. Joseph, 139 Ohio
St. 229, __, 39 N.E.2d 515, 524 (1942); Congre-
gation Committee, Jehovah's Witnesses v. City
Council, 287 S.W.2d 700, 705 (Tex. Civ. App.
1956).
'37 State ex rel. Howell v. Meador, 109 W. Va. 368,
-, 154 S.E. 876, 877 (1930).
38 State ex rel. Synod of Ohio v. Joseph, 139 Ohio
St. 229, __, 39 N.E.2d 515 (1942); Young Israel
Organization v. Dworkin, 105 Ohio App. 89, __
133 N.E.2d 174, 181 (1956).
*11 West Hartford Methodist Church v. Zoning
Board of Appeals, 143 Conn. 263, 121 A.2d 640
(.1956); Galfas v. Ailor, 81 Ga. App. 13, 57 S.E.
2d 834 (1950); Milwaukee Co. of Jehovah's Wit-
nesses v. Mullen, 214 Ore. 281, -, 330 P.2d 5,
18-20 (1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 436 (1959).
40 Milwaukee Co. of Jehovah's Witnesses v. Mul-
len, supra note 39, at __, 330 P.2d at 19. In this
case, the court rejected arguments that the church
was being deprived of equal protection of the
laws, due process, and religious freedom.
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The following have usually been held
insufficient grounds for denying a church a
permit to build in residential districts: (1)
the church because of its tax-exempt status
would cause the community to lose poten-
tial tax revenue; 41 (2) with the coming of
the church adjoining property would de-
preciate in value; 42 (3) noise and other
inconveniences would result from the build-
ing of the church. 3 The basis for this stand
is that if such reasons were sustained as
sufficient in one case, they would have to
be sustained in every case where a church
is seeking a permit to build in a residential
district, so that, in effect, churches would
be excluded from these districts.44 In West
Hartford Methodist Church v. Zoning
41 Diocese of Rochester v. Planning Board, 1 N.Y.
2d 508, 524-25, 136 N.E.2d 827, 836, 154 N.Y.S.
2d 849, 861 (1956); State ex rel. Anshe Chesed
Congregation v. Bruggemeier, 97 Ohio App. 67,
- 115 N.E.2d 65, 69 (1953).
42 Diocese of Rochester v. Planning Board, supra
note 41, at 524, 136 N.E.2d at 835, 154 N.Y.S.2d
at 861 (1956); Garden City Jewish Center v.
Incorporated Village, 2 Misc. 2d 1009, 1014, 155
N.Y.S.2d 523, 528 (Sup. Ct. 1956); Congregation
Committee, Jehovah's Witnesses v. City Council,
287 S.W.2d 700, 705 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956).
43 Diocese of Rochester v. Planning Board, supra
note 41, at 525, 136 N.E.2d at 836, 154 N.Y.S.2d
at 861 (1956); Garden City Jewish Center v.
Incorporated Village, supra note 42; State ex rel.
Roman Catholic Bishop v. Hill, 59 Nev. 231 __,
90 P.2d 217, 222 (1939). In State ex rel. Roman
Catholic Bishop v. Hill, supra, it was argued that
the funerals held at the church would have a
depressing effect on the neighbors, and the court
said in reply: "[I]t is a matter of common knowl-
edge that funeral services are frequently con-
ducted in the finest as well as the less pretentious
private homes in the Residential District of the
City of Reno. Death is a part of our existence, and
is as natural as life."
44 Diocese of Rochester v. Planning Board, supra
note 41, at 524, 136 N.E.2d at 835, 154 N.Y.S.2d
at 861 (1956); Congregation Committee, Jeho-
vah's Witnesses v. City Council, supra note 42, at
704-05.
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Board of Appeals, 45" however, some of the
above factors were held to have a substan-
tial relation to the public welfare:
Suffice it to say that these -homes will lose
much of the peace and quiet now enjoyed by
their owners. Values will fall; traffic, with its
attendant danger. and noise, will increase
greatly on Crestwood Road and other side
streets; and the privacy of some homes will
disappear with the advent of a large parking
lot at their very boundary lines. 46
In State ex rel. Anshe Chesed Congrega-
tion v. Bruggemeier,47 the basic reason for
the Board of Appeal's refusal to grant a
permit to the church was that most of the
members of the congregation would be non-
residents and would exceed the population
of the village by several times.48 The court
rejected this reason on the grounds that a
village contiguous to a metropolitan area
cannot refuse to contribute to the general
welfare of the community upon which it
depends, that membership in a church is
not confined within city boundaries, and
that the great majority of the people in the
village themselves attended services outside
the town. 49
In summary, it can be said that many
courts have not been impressed by the ar-
guments advanced for denying a permit to
a church. Of these, however, that of traffic
congestion has been more acceptable to the
courts, whereas the others have for the
most part been absolutely dismissed as
insufficient.
45 143 Conn. 263, 121 A.2d 640 (1956).
46 Id. at , 121 A.2d at 643. Cf. Milwaukee Co.
of Jehovah's Witnesses v. Mullen, 214 Ore. 281,
-, 330 P.2d 5, 18 (1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S.
436 (1959).
47 97 Ohio App. 67, 115 N.E.2d 65 (1953).
48 Id. at , 115 N.E.2d at 68-69.
49 Id. at -, 115 N.E.2d at 69.
Regulations With Which a Church Must
Conform Before Being Admitted into a
Residential District
It is often held that the building of a
church is subject to such reasonable regu-
lations as will promote the welfare of the
community. 0 Zoning ordinances, therefore,
will often contain certain requirements to
which a church must conform before it is
granted a permit to build in a residential
district. Such provisions may require that a
church be set back from the street a certain
number of feet, or that it provide a certain
amount of off-street parking facilities or
that it be a certain distance from other
buildings. The purpose of such regulations
is to prevent traffic congestion and protect
the peace, dignity and order of a commu-
nity. Whether these regulations will be sus-
tained depends upon whether they are rea-
sonably related to the public welfare, and
can be reasonably complied with by the
church.
In Portage Township v. Full Salvation
Union,,' a religious group was enjoined
from the use of its premises in violation of
a zoning ordinance which required residen-
tial dwellings to have running water, ade-
quate sewage facilities, and a substantial
foundation of mortar and stone. The group
in its regular camp meetings had contra-
vened the ordinance by erecting many tents
and temporary buildings. In Appeal of Je-
hovah's Witnesses,5 2 a provision requiring
a church to be situated one-fourth of a mile
-,o E.g., Board of Zoning Appeals v. Decatur, Indi-
ana Co. of Jehovah's Witnesses, 233 Ind. 83, __,
117 N.E.2d 115, 118 (1954); Appeal of Jehovah's
Witnesses, 183 Pa. Super. 219, -_, 130 A.2d 240,
243-44, appeal dismissed, 355 U.S. 40 (1957).
•51 318 Mich. 693, 29 N.W.2d 297 (1947).
.,2 183 Pa. Super. 219, 130 A.2d 240, appeal dis-
missed, 355 U.S. 40 (1957).
away from the next place of public assem-
bly was held to have a reasonable relation
to the public welfare, on the ground that a
number of public buildings in a residential
district would create traffic hazards in a
residential district that is not equipped to
handle large concentrations of people.5 3
The reasonableness of the provision was
further sustained by the fact that there
were other sites in the district which were
available to the church.5 4 In State ex rel.
Presbyterian Church v. Edgcomb,5 ' on the
other hand, no property owners in a certain
district could erect any building which
would cover more than twenty-five per cent
of the area of a lot. The church's request
that it be allowed to build on thirty-seven
and one-half per cent of the area of its lot
was refused by a city building official. The
court held that the provision was so re-
strictive of property rights as to be invalid.;,
As has been said, some ordinances re-
quire a church to provide off-street parking
facilities on its premises sufficient for the
needs of its congregation. The purpose of
such an ordinance is to provide relief
against traffic congestion. In a built-up resi-
dential district this provision may be diffi-
cult to comply with because space may be
lacking. Possibly because of this, the deci-
sions that have dealt with this problem have
53 Id. at __, 130 A.2d at 243.
54 Id. at , 130 A.2d at 244-45.
55 108 Neb. 859,189 N.W. 617 (1922).
5
,G Id. at -, 189 N.W. at 619. Compare Schwartz
v. Congregation Powolei Zeduck, 8 Il1. App.2d
438, 131 N.E.2d 785 (1956) (ordinance permit-
ting church only on a lot adjoining an apartment
house); O'Brien v. City of Chicago, 347 Il. App.
45, 105 N.E.2d 917 (1952) (provision allowing
the building of churches only on lots entirely sur-
rounded by streets or alleys); Board of Zoning
Appeals v. Decatur, Indiana Co. of Jehovah's Wit-
nesses, 233 Ind. 83, -, 117 N.E.2d 115, 118
(1954) (set-back provision held reasonable).
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been favorable to the church. Usually it has
been found that under the facts the church
substantially complied with the parking re-
quirement.5 7 In Board of Zoning Appeals
v. Decatur, Indiana Co. of Jehovah's Wit-
nesses,5 however, a provision requiring
one parking space for each six seats in cer-
tain types of buildings was held unconsti-
tutional as applied to the church under the
facts of the case. 5' This was a situation
where the church could not comply with
the technical requirements of the ordinance.
In reaching its decision, the court reasoned
in this manner:
It is no doubt true that automobile traffic
often chokes the streets and endangers both
the general and the travelling public. How-
ever, it is rarely, if ever, that people entering
or leaving a church cause or contribute to
traffic accidents. It would seem reasonable
to assume that if regulation is necessary to
the interests of the safety, convenience and
welfare of the general public, that should be
regulated which has a direct effect upon
such general welfare. This can be, and is,
done generally by traffic police, signs and
other reasonable regulations imposed alike
upon all persons using the streets in the
vicinity of churches, without undue inter-
ference with the right of worship and free
assembly. 0
The dissenting members of the court in this
57 Pelham Jewish Center v. Marsh, 10 App. Div.2d
645, 197 N.Y.S.2d 258 (2d Dep't 1960) (memo-
randum decision); Garden City Jewish Center v.
Incorporated Village, 2 Misc.2d 1009, 1013, 155
N.Y.S.2d 523, 527 (Sup. Ct. 1956); Redwood City
Co. of Jehovah's Witnesses v. City of Malo, 167
Cal. App. 686, 335 P.2d 195 (Dist. Ct. App.
1959); State ex rel. Tampa, Florida Co. of Jeho-
vah's Witnesses v. City of Tampa, 48 So.2d 78
(Fla. 1950); Congregation Committee, Jehovah's
Witnesses v. City Council, 287 S.W.2d 700, 704
(Tex. Civ. App. 1956).
58 233 Ind. 83, 117 N.E.2d 115 (1954).
59 Id. at ,117 N.E.2d at 121.
6Old. at , 117 N.E.2d at 120.
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case said that it was not unconstitutional
to require a church to provide a reasonable
amount of off-street parking facilities. 6
1
What Is Considered to Be Within the
Meaning of the Word "Church"
The problem to be considered here con-
cerns what accessory uses of church prop-
erty are included within the word "church."
In the cases that have dealt with this prob-
lem, the decisions have supported the prop-
osition that a "church" consists of more
than a building for public worship. This
proposition is directly supported by Com-
munity Synagogue v. Bates.62 There, a per-
mit had been refused by the Board of
Appeals to a synagogue on the ground that
it would be used for other than strictly reli-
gious purposes, since there were contem-
plated such accessory uses as a Sunday
school, a men's club, a women's social
group, and youth activities. The court re-
jected this contention, stating as follows:
Strictly religious uses and activities are more
than prayer and sacrifice and all churches
recognize that the area of their responsibility
is broader than leading the congregation in
prayer. The Church has always developed
social groups for adults and youth where the
fellowship of the congregation is strength-
ened with the result that the parent church
61 Id. at -, 117 N.E.2d at 121, 124 (dissenting
opinion).
62 1 N.Y.2d 445, 136 N.E.2d 488, 154 N.Y.S.2d
15 (1956).
63 Id. at 453, 136 N.E.2d at 493, 154 N.Y.S.2d at
21-22. Accord, Diocese of Rochester v. Planning
Board, 1 N.Y.2d 508, 525-26, 136 N.E.2d 827,
836-37, 154 N.Y.S.2d 849, 862-63 (1956). Cf.
Board of Zoning Appeals v. Wheaton, 118 Ind.
App. 38, 76 N.E.2d 597 (1948) (convent held
permissible accessory use); Mahrt v. First Church
of Christ, Scientist, 142 N.E.2d 567, 577-78 (Ohio
C.P. 1955), afl'd, 142 N.E.2d 678 (Ohio Ct. App.
1956) (parking lot held permissible accessory
use).
is strengthened. . . .To limit a church to
being merely a house of prayer and sacrifice
would, in a large degree, be depriving the
church of the opportunity of enlarging, per-
petuating, and strengthening itself and the
congregation. 63
This problem was indirectly touched
upon in Diocese of Central New York v.
Schwarzer,6 4 where the plaintiff was pro-
posing to use a particular site as a place in
which a series of programs of religious
study and contemplation would be con-
ducted. The court held that since the zoning
ordinance in question permitted churches,
parish houses, convents and parochial
schools in the district, a combination of
these uses on the one site would be per-
missible.
6 5
The parochial school, likewise, is con-
sidered by some as essentially connected
with a church. Frequently the problem in
this area arises when a zoning ordinance
will allow public schools in a residential
district, but not private schools. When a
parochial school is involved, a number of
courts have taken the position that such an
ordinance is unreasonable and discrimina-
tory.6 If the erection of a public school in
a residential district does not harm the
public welfare, neither does the erection of
a private school; in fact both contribute
greatly to the public welfare.67 Moreover,
64 23 Misc.2d 515, 199 N.Y.S.2d 939 (Sup. Ct.
1960).
65 Ibid. Accord, Overbrook Farms Club v. Zoning
Board of Adjustment, 351 Pa. 77, 40 A.2d 423
(1945); Appeal of Floersheim, 348 Pa. 98, 34
A.2d 62 (1943).
66 Roman Catholic Welfare Corp. v. City of Pied-
mont, 45 Cal.2d 325, 289 P.2d 438 (1955); Cath-
olic Bishop v. Kingery, 371 111. 257, 20 N.E.2d 583
(1939). See Hoelzer v. Village of New Hyde Park,
4 Misc.2d 96, 98, 150 N.Y.S.2d 765, 767 (Sup. Ct.
1956).
67 Catholic Bishop v. Kingery, 371 111. 257, 20
N.E.2d 583 (1939). The court said: "We fail to
in Roman Catholic Welfare Corp. v. City of
Piedmont,"s the court set forth the propo-
sition that "parents have the right to send
their children to private schools, rather than
public ones, which are located in their
immediate locality or general neighbor-
hood."6 9 Tustin Heights Ass'n v. Board of
Supervisors,7 0 on the other hand, stands to
some degree opposed to the position taken
by the above courts in this matter. There,
a conditional permit had to be obtained
before any school would be allowed in the
district. Since on its face this requirement
applied to all schools, both public and pri-
vate, the ordinance was not apparently dis-
criminatory. It was argued on behalf of the
school, however, that by state law no public
school could in fact be restricted in any
district, so that the ordinance was in prac-
tice discriminatory. 7 ' The court rejected the
contention, saying:
Respondent church argues that since the
ordinance is ineffective as to public schools
it is an unconstitutional denial of equal pro-
tection of the law if applied to private
schools. The argument is untenable in that
it assumes that due process and equal pro-
tection of the law are synonymous with
equal treatment of private citizens and the
perceive to what degree a Catholic school of this
type will be more detrimental or dangerous to the
public health than a public school. It is not pointed
out to us just how the pupils in attendance at the
parochial school are any more likely to jeopardize
the public safety than the public school pupils.
Nor can we arbitrarily conclude that the pros-
pective students of the new school will seriously
undermine the general welfare. As a matter of
fact such a school, conducted in accordance with
the educational requirements established by State
educational authorities, is promotive of the gen-
eral welfare." id. at , 20 N.E.2d at 584.
68 45 Cal.2d 325, 289 P.2d 438 (1955).
69 Id. at __, 289 P.2d at 441.
71 170 Cal. App. 619, 339 P.2d 914 (Dist. Ct.
App. 1959).
71 Id. at-, 339 P.2d at 922.
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sovereign. Respondent's argument is that
since the state may not be regulated in this
particular field of activity, neither can the
same activity of a private individual or cor-
poration be so regulated. If this theory of
equal protection were valid, it would neces-
sarily apply to all activities of the state, not
just public schools.7 2
Conclusion
As regards zoning regulation applied to
churches, two attitudes are displayed. Some
feel that the strict application of zoning to
churches will force them into areas away
from the private home, resulting in a weak-
ening of religion's force in society,73 while
others, stressing the importance of compre-
hensive zoning, take the position that
churches should not easily be exempted
from its reach.7 4 Most courts have taken
the first point of view.
It is submitted that if the building of
churches in residential neighborhoods is to
be restricted or regulated in any way, it
should at least be made certain that people
in all neighborhoods will be afforded the
opportunity of being reasonably close to a
church of their own choice. If this principle
is not adhered to, it would seem that the
72 Id. at -, 339 P.2d at 922-23. Contra, Brandeis
School v. Village of Lawrence, 8 Misc.2d 550,
560-61, 184 N.Y.S.2d 687, 697 (Sup. Ct. 1959).
In Andrews v. Board of Adjustment, 30 N.J. 245,
- 152 A.2d 580, 584 (1959), the court by way
of dictum said that there might be justification for
not putting public and private schools in a single
category for zoning purposes, For an article
against differentiation between public and private
schools in zoning ordinances, see Seitz, Constitu-
tional and General Welfare Considerations in Ef-
forts to Zone Out Private Schools, 11 MIAMI L. Q.
68 (1956).
73 See Note, Zoning Laws And The Church, 27
ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 93, 103 (1952).
74 See Milwaukee Co. of Jehovah's Witnesses v.
Mullen, 214 Ore. 281, -, 330 P.2d 5, 21, 27-28,
cert. denied, 359 U.S. 436 (1959).
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free exercise of religion is being violated,
and the work of the church in society is
being discouraged. Finally, it should not be
forgotten that churches, if gracefully built,
add to the beauty of the finest residential
neighborhood. As one court so well said:
Over the generations we have seen Ameri-
can churches in the quiet, dignified sur-
roundings of residential districts readily
accessible to the members of the congrega-
tion. ... Churches in fitting surroundings are
an inspiration to their members and to the
general public. If located in the residential
district - space, perspective, greenswards
and trees aid in setting off the beauty of the
building and thereby increasing its inspira-
tion. To require that churches be banished
to the business district, crowded alongside
filling stations and grocery stores, is clearly
not to be justified on the score of promoting
the general welfare. 75
Examination of Jurors
as to Religious Prejudice
The right to trial by jury is fundamental.
Yet this most cherished of American con-
stitutional rights would be an empty and
unavailing one were it not implemented by
certain procedural safeguards designed to
assure the selection of an impartial jury.
Prominent among these is the right of a
party to an action - criminal or civil - to
examine persons called to serve as jurors
so that all who are biased, prejudiced or
otherwise unqualified to serve may be ex-
cluded. In the conduct of this examination
of prospective jurors, inquiry into their re-
ligious beliefs or affiliations may well be
appropriate in a particular case. It is the
purpose of the present discussion to at-
tempt to answer the following general
75 State ex rel. Synod of Ohio v. Joseph, 139 Ohio
St. 229._- 39 N.E.2d 515, 524 (1942).
questions regarding interrogation into the
religious beliefs and affiliations of jurors
and the effect of exclusion from jury serv-
ice on account of such beliefs or affilia-
tions. When are questions pertaining to the
religious beliefs or the denomination of a
prospective juror permissible? What types
of questions may be asked of a prospective
juror to ascertain whether he will, by rea-
son of his religion, be unduly prejudiced
for or against one of the parties to the suit?
What is the effect of a systematic exclusion
from the jury of members of a particular
religious grouping?
The right to challenge prospective jurors
on voir dire examination has always been
regarded as an integral part of the right to
trial by jury.' In fact, so important is the
right to a fair and impartial jury that pro-
vision is made not only for the challenge of
jurors for cause but also for the added safe-
guard of the peremptory challenge, i.e., an
objection to a juror for which no reason
need be assigned, but upon which the court
must nevertheless exclude the juror. 2 Stat-
utes in the various states specify the
grounds for which challenge for cause may
be made and usually specify the number of
peremptory challenges to which the parties
are limited.3
Although the grounds for challenge for
cause and the number of peremptory chal-
lenges to which a party is entitled are statu-
torily defined, the extent to which counsel
1 See Menefee v. State, 30 Okla. Crim. 400, 236
Pac. 439 (1925).
' Swift & Co. v. Platte, 68 Kan. 1, 72 Pac. 271,
rev'd on other grounds, 69 Kan. 1, 74 Pac. 635
(1903).
3 See, e.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 51, §§1, 2, 5, 16,
24 (1957); N. Y. Civ. PRAC. ACT §§450-55; OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §§572-74 (1960); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 22, §§654-60 (1937)..
may go in examining prospective jurors on
voir dire is left largely for judicial determi-
nation. It is the duty of the trial judge to
supervise the selection of an' impartial
jury. 4 The trial court has a great deal of
discretion concerning what may be asked
of prospective jurors on voir dire examina-
tion.5 Appellate courts are generally reluc-
tant to overturn discretionary decisions of
the trial judge in reference to the exami-
nation of jurors.0 Only where the trial
court's decision on a question relating to
the exclusion of jurors is clearly erroneous
will an appellate court consider reversing, 7
and even then it will reverse only if the
error was one which denied the appellant
substantial rights.8
When Inquiry Proper
The courts have traditionally allowed at-
torneys a great deal of latitude in their
examination of the jury panel. 9 Although
counsel are permitted a wide range within
which to conduct their examination of
4 Gregg v. State, 69 Okla. Crim. 103, 121, 101
P.2d 289, 296 (1940).
- United States v. Barra, 149 F.2d 489, 491 (2d
Cir. 1945); United States v. Daily, 139 F.2d 7, 9
(7th Cir. 1943); Adams v. State, 200 Md. 133,
88 A.2d 556 (1952); Rose v. Sheedy, 345 Mo.
610, 134 S.W.2d 18 (1939) (per curiam); Van
Skike v. Potter, 53 Neb. 28, 73 N.W. 295 (1897);
State v. Huff, 14 N.J. 240, 102 A.2d 8 (1954).
6 See Searle v. Roman Catholic Bishop, 203 Mass.
493, 89 N.E. 809 (1909).
7 Rose v. Sheedy, 345 Mo. 610, 134 S.W.2d 18
(1939) (per curiam).
8 Amandes, Jury Challenge in Criminal Cases:
When, How, and Group Membership Bias as a
Basis Therefor, 3 WAYNE L. REV. 106, 112-13
(1957).
9 State v. Miller, 60 Mdaho 79, 88 P.2d 526
(1939); Swift & Co. v. Platte, 68 Kan. 1, 72.
Pac. 271, rev'd on other grounds, 69 Kan. 1, 74
Pac. 635 (1903); see United States v. Daily, 139
F.2d 7, 9 (7th Cir. 1943).
7 CATHOLIC LAWYER, SPRING 1961
prospective jurors, inquiry into the reli-
gious beliefs or affiliations of a prospective
juror may be made only where pertinent to
the issues at hand' ° or, according to some
courts, when it will enable a party to make
more effective use of his right to a peremp-
tory challenge. 1
When there are no issues of a religious
nature involved or no special circumstances
raising the possibility of religious preju-
dice, some courts hold that counsel may
not examine prospective jurors as to their
religious beliefs. 12 Thus in Rose v. Sheedy,' 3
an action to recover for personal injuries
resulting from an alleged assault, the Su-
preme Court of Missouri held that it was
proper for the trial court to prohibit ques-
tions as to which church a prospective
juror belonged because the attorney asking
the question did not show why the question
was pertinent. The court indicated that
although a prospective juror may be asked
any pertinent question tending to show
bias or prejudice, questions concerning re-
ligious or political affiliations are not
always pertinent. It was pointed out that
10 See, e.g., Rose v. Sheedy, supra note 7; Van
Skike v. Potter, 53 Neb. 28, 73 N.W. 295 (1897).
"It is the duty of the trial court to see that upon
such inquiry [the voir dire examination of pro-
spective jurors], no collateral or unrelated issue
is brought into the case .... The court very prop-
erly confined inquiry to the issues to be tried by
the jury .... United States v. Daily, supra note 9.
11 State v. Miller, 60 Idaho 79, 88 P.2d 526
(1939); Wasy v. State, 234 Ind. 52, 123 N.E.2d
462 (1955); Young v. State, 41 Okla. Crim. 226,
271 Pac. 426 (1928).
12 Yarborough v. United States, 230 F.2d 56, 63
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 969 (1956);
People v. Chambers, 22 Cal. App. 2d 687, 708-09,
72 P.2d 746, 756 (Dist. Ct. App. 1937); Rose v.
Sheedy, supra note 7; State v. Huff, 14 N.J. 240,
102 A.2d 8 (1954).
1. 345 Mo. 610, 134 S.W.2d 18 (1939) (per
curiam).
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whereas some questions are always. perti-
nent, for example, those seeking to estab-
lish a relationship of the jurors to the parties
to the suit or an interest of the jurors in the
outcome of the litigation, questions dealing
with the religion of prospective jurors be-
come pertinent only "under peculiar cir-
cumstances."
14
Some courts allow interrogation into the
religious background of a prospective juror
even when no religious issues or special
circumstances are present. These courts
proceed on the assumption that such in-
quiry should be allowed to enable a more
enlightened exercise of the right to peremp-
tory challenge.15 This was the view of the
court in Young v. State.16 In that case, the
trial court had permitted counsel for the
state in a prosecution for manslaughter to
ask the members of the jury panel whether
they were or had been members of any
church. On appeal, the defendant con-
tended that it was improper to question a
prospective juror concerning his member-
ship in a church or other organization. The
Criminal Court of Appeals of Oklahoma
held that such questioning was proper pro-
vided it was confined within reasonable
bounds and limited by a fair discretion of
the court. The court's holding was based on
the ground that such questioning might
give counsel information which would en-
14 Ibid. Accord, Van Skike v. Potter, 53 Neb. 28,
73 N.W. 295 (1897), which held that the trial
court did not err in precluding counsel for plain-
tiff in a suit for malpractice of medicine from
asking whether the prospective jurors belonged to
any religious or secret societies. Since no such
society was even remotely connected with the
case, the court indicated that no useful purpose
could be served by allowing such a line of ques-
tioning.
15 See cases cited note 1I supra.
16 41 Okla. Crim. 226, 271 Pac. 426 (1928).
able him to make a more intelligent use
of his peremptory challenges. Maryland
courts, however, do not permit counsel to
"fish" for information from prospective
jurors in order to determine how best to
exercise peremptory challenges.1 7
When the factual situation has religious
doctrinal overtones s or when special cir-
cumstances warrant inquiry into the reli-
gion of a prospective juror,19 the courts
permit counsel to make such an inquiry.
The defendant in Miles v. United States20
was convicted of the crime of bigamy. He
appealed to the Supreme Court of the
United States where he contended that it
was error for the trial court to have per-
mitted interrogation into the religious be-
liefs of a proposed juror. The Court held
that the questions regarding the religion of
the prospective jurors were proper and that
certain of the jurors were properly found
disqualified because they believed that the
practice of polygamy was obedience to the
will of God. Said the Court:
It needs no argument to show that a jury
composed of men entertaining such a belief
could not have been free from bias or
prejudice on the trial for bigamy, of a per-
17 Handy v. State, 101 Md. 39, 60 Atl. 452 (1905);
Emery v. F. P. Asher, Jr. & Sons, 196 Md. 1,
75 A.2d 333 (1950). The court in the Handy
case cites several English and American decisions
indicative of the view that a party should not be
permitted to engage in speculative questioning of
prospective jurors.
Is See Miles v. United States, 103 U.S. 304
(1880); Reynolds v. United States, 1 Utah 226
(1875), afl'd, 98 U.S. 145 (1878). Both the Rey-
nolds and Miles cases involved prosecutions for
polygamy. In both cases questions regarding the
religious beliefs of prospective jurors were per-
mitted.
19 See People v. Christie, 2 Abb. Pr. 256 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1855); Potter v. State, 86 Tex. Crim.
380, 216 S.W. 886 (1919).
20 103 U.S. 304 (1880).
son who entertained the same belief, and
whose offence consisted in the act of living
in polygamy. 21
The Court regarded it as entirely immate-
rial that the bias was founded on the relig-
ious beliefs of the jurors and indicated
that it would not be an invasion of the con-
stitutional rights of a juror called to try a
party charged with bigamy to ask him
whether he himself was living in polygamy
or whether he believed it to be divinely
ordained.
However, the mere fact that the issue
has reference to the tenets of a particular
religion does not give counsel the right to
inquire into the religion of the prospective
jurors.2 2 In State v. Weiss2'3 it was held
improper in a prosecution for abortion to
allow questions as to whether prospective
jurors were members of any church whose
tenets had reference to birth control.
Adams v. State24 also involved a prosecu-
tion for abortion. In that case the trial
court had denied a motion by the defense
counsel that the court question each pros-
pective juror concerning his church affilia-
tion. Instead the court asked whether the
prospective juror would be unable to give
the defendants a fair and impartial trial for
any religious or political reason. On ap-
peal, the Court of Appeals of Maryland, in
affirming the judgment of conviction, held
that the trial court did not err in denying
21 Id. at 3 10.
22 Adams v. State, 200 Md. 133, 88 A.2d 556
(1952); State v. Weiss, 130 N.J.L. 149, 31 A.2d
848 (Sup. Ct. 1943), afi'd, 131 N.J.L. 228, 35
A.2d 895 (Ct. Err. & App. 1944) (per curiam).
But see Wasy v. State, 234 Ind. 52, 123 N.E.2d
462 (1955).
2'3 130 N.J.L. 149, 31 A.2d 848 (Sup. Ct. 1943),
afi'd, 131 N.J.L. 228, 35 A.2d 895 (Ct. Err. &
App. 1944) (per curiam).
24200 Md. 133, 88 A.2d 556 (1952).
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the defense counsel's motion. The court
stated:
Religious or ethical beliefs as to the practice
of abortion may range from the view that
abortion, or even contraception, in any
form or under any circumstances is morally
wrong, to a view that the prevention of an
unwanted child may be morally right, under
circumstances not directly related to the
mother's physical survival. But unless such
beliefs would prevent an impartial consid-
eration of the evidence and a proper appli-
cation of the existing law, they would not
disqualify.2 5
Both polygamy and abortion are prac-
tices fraught with religious 'implications.
Both have given rise to varied but staunchly
adhered to religious doctrines. Yet the
Court in the Miles case permitted ques-
tioning of the prospective jurors concerning
their religion, whereas in the Weiss and
Adams cases such questioning was pre-
cluded. However, the cases may perhaps
be more compatible if viewed in the fol-
lowing light. The proper object of all exam-
ination into the religious backgrounds of
prospective jurors is the elimination of
those whose verdicts will be affected by
reason of their religion. In Miles, sympa-
thetic treatment of the defendant was a
very likely possibility siice a juror of the
Mormon faith at the time might not only
believe in polygamy, but might also be
engaged in the practice himself. In the
Adams case, however, any attitudes of the
jurors regarding abortion were in all proba-
bility confined to intellectual conviction.
In Potter v. State26 the issues were devoid
of religious doctrinal overtones, but the
special circumstances were shown to sup-
port inquiry into the religious backgrounds
of prospective jurors. The case involved an
25 Id. at 141, 88 A.2d at 559-60.
26 86 Tex. Crim. 380. 216 S.W. 886 (1919).
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indictment for criminal libel. The libel was
contained in a newspaper article in which
the defendant severely criticized the Jewish
race. The trial court ruled out a question
as to whether Jewish persons or persons
affiliated with Jews would be prejudiced
against defendant if it developed on the
trial that he had printed an article defaming
Jews. The Court of Criminal Appeals of
Texas, in reversing, held that the question
should have been permitted. Apparently
the court felt that the jurors questioned
might be unduly prejudiced against the de-
fendant if it developed that he was anti-
semitic.
Scope of the Inquiry
Although it is generally conceded that a
prospective juror may be examined regard-
ing his religious beliefs, 27 the range of per-
missible inquiry varies. The scope of the
examination of prospective jurors is regu-
lated by the sound discretion of the trial
court and the bounds of reason. 28
Questions designed to ascertain whether
certain religious beliefs or affiliations of a
member of the jury panel will affect his
verdict are usually held permissible. 29 In
27 Miles v. United States, 103 U.S. 304 (1880);
Wasy v. State, 234 Ind. 52, 123 N.E.2d 462
(1955); People v. Christie, 2 Abb. Pr. 256 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1855); Young v. State, 41 Okla. Crim.
226, 271 Pac. 426 (1928); Potter v. State, 86 Tex.
Crim. 380, 216 S.W. 886 (1919); Reynolds v.
United States, 1 Utah 226 (1875), afl'd, 98 U.S.
145 (1878).
28 See cases cited note 5 supra.
29 Miles v. United States, 103 U.S. 304 (1880);
Smith v. Smith, 7 Cal. App. 2d 271, 46 P.2d 232
(Dist. Ct. App. 1935); Reynolds v. United States,
1 Utah 226 (1875), a0f'd, 98 U.S. 145 (1878). A
prospective juror may be questioned in regard to
membership in any "political, religious, social,
industrial, fraternal, law-enforcement, or other
organization whose beliefs or teaching would
prejudice him for or against either party to . ..
the Miles case, the state court, speaking of
the potential impact of a religious belief on
a juror's verdict, said:
A religious belief takes strong hold upon
the individual. If a person believes it is his
religious duty or privilege to do an act, he
would not, as a consequence, look upon
such act as criminal .... [Hie would natu-
rally .. .be averse to inflicting punishment
therefor. In such a case he would naturally
lean toward an acquittal, and would possess
that state of mind which would lead to a
just inference that he would not act with
entire impartiality in the case.3 0
In Smith v. Smith,3 an action by a for-
mer wife to recover amounts allegedly due
under a property settlement, it was held
proper to question prospective jurors on
voir dire as to what effect their religious
beliefs in regard to divorce and remarriage
might have on their verdict.
A prospective juror may also be ques-
tioned regarding his attitude towards a par-
ticular religion adhered to by a party to the
suit.32 In United States v. Daily33 the de-
fendant was indicted for violation of the
Selective Training and Service Act of
194031 in failing to report for induction
when ordered to do so. He claimed that he
had been incorrectly classified by his draft
board since he was a minister of the Jeho-
[the] case." People v. Buyle, 22 Cal. App. 2d 143,
146, 70 P.2d 955, 957 (Dist. Ct. App. 1937)
(emphasis added).
30 United States v. Miles, 2 Utah 19, 22, rev'd on
other grounds, 103 U.S. 304 (1881).
31 7 Cal. App. 2d 271, 46 P.2d 232 (Dist. Ct.
App. 1935).
32United States v. Daily, 139 F.2d 7 (7th Cir.
1943); Casey v. Roman Catholic Archbishop, 217
Md. 595, 143 A.2d 627 (1958); People v. Chris-
tie, 2 Abb. Pr. 256 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1855); Horst
v. Silverman, 20 Wash. 233, 55 Pac. 52 (1898)
(per curiam).
33 139 F.2d 7 (7th Cir. 1943).
34 54 Stat. 885, ch. 720 (1940).
vah's Witnesses. The Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit held that the defendant
had the right to inquire of the members of
the venire whether any of them entertained
any prejudice against members of the Je-
hovah's Witnesses.
In People v. Christie3 members of the
Ancient Order of Hibernians, who took part
in a parade in New York City, were in-
dicted for a resulting riot. At the time, the
court noted, the inhabitants of the city,
including the police, were strongly preju-
diced against Irish and Roman Catholics.
Counsel for the defense asked a prospective
juror whether he had any bias or prejudice
against Roman Catholics. The prosecution
successfully objected on the ground that the
juror was not bound to answer if he thought
it would disgrace him to do so. In reversing,
the appellate court said that the right to be
tried by an impartial, unprejudiced jury "is
not to be sacrificed to the fear or apprehen-
sion of wounding the feelings of others.13 6
Regarding the specificity of questions
concerning the religious prejudice of jurors,
some courts hold that such questions should
be limited to such general inquiries as
whether the prospective juror feels he will
be unable to act fairly and impartially as a
juror37 for any religious or political reason.
Casey v. Roman Catholic Archbishop3s re-
quired a more specific inquiry. In that case
plaintiff brought suit for personal injuries
sustained when she fell on a newly waxed
aisle of her parish church. On the voir dire
examination the trial court refused plain-
tiff's request to question the members of
35 2 Abb. Pr. 256 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1855).
36 Id. at 258.
37 State v. Maxwell, 151 Kan. 951, 102 P.2d 109
(1940); Adams v. State, 200 Md. 1, 88 A.2d 556
(1952).
38 217 Md. 595, 143 A.2d 627 (1958).
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the jury panel as to whether they might be
biased because of the nature of the suit or
the fact that the defendant was an eccle-
siastical corporation. Instead the court pro-
pounded a more general question as to
whether the prospective jurors had any rea-
son, such as religious scruples, which would
prevent them from acting impartially on
the trial. The court made no reference to
the fact that defendant was a corporation
and not a prelate being sued personally or
as a church official. Plaintiff appealed from
a verdict in her favor which she claimed to
be inadequate. The Maryland Court of
Appeals reversed the lower court's judg-
ment and remanded the case for a new
trial. Although indicating that the form of
the question to be asked was clearly up to
the discretion of the trial judge, the court
held that the trial court's question had not
informed the prospective jurors of the na-
ture of the action and the identity of the
defendant with sufficient specification. The
court pointed out that it should have been
made clear to the jurors that the suit was
against a corporation as the holder of the
legal title to the church building, and that
it was not a suit against the Archbishop of
Baltimore personally or as an ecclesiastical
official.
Although religious prejudice against a
party's principal witness might be detri-
mental to that party, as would religious
prejudice against the party himself, ques-
tions designed to determine the attitudes of
a prospective juror toward the religious
faith of a witness do not seem to be permis-
sible. 39 Counsel for the defendant in State
v. Holedger40 asked a prospective juror
whether he would give more weight to the




word of a preacher than "any other gentle-
man," and whether he would attach more
credence to the testimony of a particular
witness named, who was a minister, than to
the testimony of anyone else. The State
objected to these questions and the court
sustained the objection. On appeal, these
questions were dismissed as "so apparently
improper and irrelevant" as not to warrant
discussion of them. 4 1
The Religion of the Juror
Generally jurors are not disqualified
solely because of their adherence to a par-
ticular religion. 42 Church membership is
not a qualification for serving on a jury. 43
Thus, the prevailing view is that mere ad-
herence to the same religious denomination
as one of the parties to an action will not
per se disqualify a juror from serving in
the case.44
41 Ibid. Accord, Horst v. Silverman, 20 Wash.
233, 55 Pac. 52 (1898) (per curiam). In this case
it was held proper to ask whether a prospective
juror entertained any prejudice against people of
the Jewish faith but that it would be improper,
and therefore the trial court properly ruled out a
question as to whether as much credence would be
given to the testimony of witnesses who professed
the Jewish faith as to that of the members of any
other faith.
4 2 See Smith v. Smith, 7 Cal. App. 2d 271, 46
P.2d 232 (Dist. Ct. App. 1935); In re Malvasi's
Estate, 96 Cal. App. 204, 273 Pac. 1097 (Dist.
Ct. App. 1929); Rose v. Sheedy, 345 Mo. 610,
134 S.W.2d 18 (1939) (per curiam).
43 See Rose v. Sheedy, supra note 42, wherein it
is indicated that church membership is neither a
qualification for serving on a jury, nor is it a suffi-
cient ground for disqualification from jury service.
44 Smith v. Sisters of Good Shepherd, 27 Ky. L.
Rep. 1107, 87 S.W. 1083 (Ct. App. 1905); Searle
v. Roman Catholic Bishop, 203 Mass. 493, 89
N.E. 809 (1909); American Creosote Works v.
Harp, 215 Miss. 5, 60 So. 2d 514 (1952); Barton
v. Erickson, 14 Neb. 164, 15 N.W. 206 (1883).
Smith v. Sisters of Good Shepherd4  is
illustrative of the general proposition that
a juror may not be excluded solely because
he is affiliated with the same church as a
party to the suit. In that case the plaintiff,
a Protestant who had resided in a Catholic
institution for wayward women, brought
suit for alleged false imprisonment and
cruel treatment by the Sisters of the Good
Shepherd who operated the institution. The
trial court refused to discharge certain ju-
rors who were Catholics. On appeal, the
court held that this was not error since it
was not shown that they were placed on
the panel because they were Catholics, nor
that they had any interest in the litigation.
The appellate court felt that practical con-
siderations prohibited such exclusion be-
cause in a state in which most of the people
were either Catholics or Protestants (as
was the case in Kentucky at the time), it
would be practically impossible to select a
jury in an action in which one of the par-
ties is Catholic and the other Protestant.
American Creosote Works v. Harp46 was
a suit for personal injuries allegedly caused
by the defendant's negligence. On appeal,
it was contended by the defendant that the
trial court had erred in not sustaining a
challenge for cause to a proposed juror.
The latter, it appeared on voir dire, lived in
the same community as did the plaintiff
and was a member of the same church and
lodge. The juror was asked if this would
influence his verdict. His response was that
he would not be influenced and would try
the case as if it were a suit -between parties
of whom he had never heard. The court
was of the opinion that a prospective juror
is not rendered unfit to serve merely be-
4527 Ky. L. Rep. 1107, 87 S.W. 1083 (Ct. App.
1905).
46215 Miss. 5, 60 So. 2d 514 (1952).
cause he and one of the parties are of the
same religious denomination or fraternal
order.
Systematic Exclusion of Members
of a Particular Group
If an eligible class of persons is excluded
from a jury panel, the party whose inter-
ests may be affected may challenge the
panel.47 A panel of jurors may also be
challenged when it is formed wholly or
partially from jurors whose names were not
drawn from a jury box, but were sum-
moned by an officer who was biased or
prejudiced. 48 However, the challenge to
the panel or array may be made before
accepting the jury drawn and before the
trial commences.4 9 Failure to challenge the
panel at the time the jury is being selected
or before trial may constitute a waiver of
objection to the exclusion of a particular
group of eligible persons. 50
Where a particular class of persons is
systematically excluded in the selection of
persons eligible for jury service, a party
adversely affected may have grounds for a
reversal.5 1 Although a party to an action
47 See Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303,
312 (1879) (negroes excluded from petit and
grand juries); Ware v. State, 146 Ark. 321, 225
S.W. 626 (1920) (negroes excluded from petit
and grand juries); Tillman v. State, 121 Ark. 322,
181 S.W. 890 (1915) (negroes excluded from
-grand jury).
48 Roof v. State, 34 Okla. Cr. 145, 245 Pac. 666
(1926).
49 Ware v. State, 146 Ark. 321, 332-33, 225 S.W.
626, 631 (1920).
50 People v. Duncan, 261 Ill. 339, 343-44, 103
N.E. 1043, 1045-46 (1913).
51 Walter v. State, 208 Ind. 231, 195 N.E. 268
(1935); Searle v. Roman Catholic Bishop, 203
Mass. 493, 89 N.E. 809 (1909); Hildreth v. City
of Troy, 101 N.Y. 234, 4 N.E. 559 (1886);
Juarez v. State, 102 Tex. Crim. 297, 277 S.W.
1091 (1925) (grand jury).
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cannot insist on a jury composed of mem-
bers of his own class,5 2 race, sex, or relig-
ion, he does have a legal right to have the
jury chosen from an unrestricted range of
persons eligible for jury service.53 Searle v.
Roman Catholic Bishop54 is precisely in
point. In that case the defendant was a
Roman Catholic Bishop who held title, as
trustee, to the land in controversy. At the
request of the plaintiff, the trial court ruled
that no person of the Roman Catholic faith
should serve on the jury. Under this ruling
two prospective jurors whose names were
drawn from the jury box were excluded.
The ground for the trial court's ruling was
that title to the real estate involved in the
litigation was held in trust for the Roman
Catholic Church and that therefore all per-
sons who were members of that church had
a pecuniary interest in the litigation. The
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
reversed and held that the ruling was erro-
neous because it applied to all persons of
the Roman Catholic faith without regard
to their residence or to any affiliation with
the particular local church. The court held
that this error was prejudicial and war-
ranted reversal because it rendered the
statutory right of the defendant to peremp-
tory challenges materially less valuable.
The exclusion of a competent juror may
constitute grounds for reversal even though
the jurors who actually served for the case
52 See Comment, Class Discrimination in Selec-
tion of Jurors, 5 CATHOLIC U. L. REV. 157, 161,
162 (1955); Gregg v. State, 2 Okla. Crim. 103,
121, 101 P.2d 289, 296 (1940). "The defendant
has no vested right to have any particular juror
on the panel selected to serve in his case. His
right is that of refusal rather than that of selec-
tion." Ibid.
53 Walter v. State, 208 Ind. 231, 195 N.E. 268
(1935); Hildreth v. City of Troy, 101 N.Y. 234,
4 N.E. 559 (1886).
54 203 Mass. 493, 89 N.E. 809 (1909).
NOTES AND COMMENTS
were qualified. Illustrative of this is the case
of Hildreth v. City of Troy,55 in which per-
sons otherwise qualified to serve as jurors
were excluded by the trial court in a suit
against the city because they were taxpay-
ers and residents of that city. It was con-
tended on appeal that this was not error
warranting reversal because the jurors who
tried the case were qualified in all respects.
The court, however, rejected this argument,
indicating that although no one could say
whether or not the result would have been
different had the city residents been allowed
to sit as jurors, a party to a suit has a legal
right to have the jury selected indiscrimi-
nately, and not from a class-restricted
range.5 6
Another view is that prejudicial error
occurs only when a juror is improperly
permitted to serve.5 7 According to this view,
no reversible error is committed if jurors
are excused without sufficient cause; an
error constitutes grounds for reversal only
when a sufficient challenge for cause has
been overruled, the complaining party has
exhausted his peremptory challenges, and
one or more jurors were thereby improp-
erly allowed to serve. 58 Under this view, it
seems that if a juror is excluded solely be-
55 101 N.Y. 234, 4 N.E. 559 (1886).
56 "The law prescribes the qualification of jurors.
The court cannot add to or detract from them. It
cannot itself select the jury, directly or indirectly.
It cannot in its discretion or capriciously set aside
jurors as incompetent, whom the law declares are
competent, and thus limit the selection of the jury.
. . . If this is done, a legal right is violated, for
which an appellate court will give redress." Hil-
dreth v. City of Troy, 101 N.Y. 234, 239, 4 N.E.
559, 562 (1886).
57 See Amandes, Jury Challenge in Criminal
Cases: When, How, and Group Membership Bias
as a Basis Therefor, 3 WAYNE L. REv. 106, 112-13
(1957).
58 Ibid.
cause of his religion, this would not be
ground for reversal.
Conclusion
Courts usually permit inquiry into a ju-
ror's religious beliefs or background if the
inquiry is relevant. The argument may be
advanced that such inquiry is futile because
prejudice exists, consciously or subcon-
sciously, in most of us.
The prospective juror ought not be per-
mitted to be the exclusive judge of his own
freedom from prejudice. The trial judge
should not permit a person whose impar-
tiality is subject to serious doubt to serve
unless he is convinced, after questioning
such person himself, that he will be able to
completely disregard any related religious
belief or position of his church. The trial
court has both jurors and counsel before it,
and is best qualified to determine the ex-
tent and nature of the questions directed to
the prospective jurors and whether they
answer them truthfully.
The form and content of the questions
on voir dire should be carefully scrutinized
by the trial judge. Prolonged questioning
on voir dire may be resorted to by counsel
as a device calculated to predispose the
jury in his client's favor.59 The court should
be on guard against such exploitation of
the examination and should prevent ques-
tions framed to incite the religious or other
prejudices of the members of the panel.
However, the questions should not be re-
stricted to general inquiries having refer-
ence to prejudices. The court should permit
counsel to be sufficiently specific, so that
59 See, e.g., Swift & Co. v. Platte, 68 Kan. 1, 72
Pac. 271 (1903), wherein it was held error to
permit counsel for the plaintiff in a personal injury
case to ask questions in the voir dire examination
of jurors which unnecessarily suggested that the
defendant was insured.
the members of the jury panel will be ap-
prised of the kind of bias or prejudice to
which counsel is referring.
In connection with the deliberate dis-
qualification from the jury of all members
of a particular religious background, it
should be noted that serious doubts of con-
stitutionality may be raised if there is no
compelling reason for such exclusion.6" In
o See Juarez v. State, 102 Tex. Crim. 297, 277
S.W. 1091 (1925).
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the Miles case there was a sound reason
for the exclusion of all Mormons from the
jury. But ordinarily it is difficult to justify
the systematic exclusion of all members of
a particular religious persuasion. Equality
and due process demand that a defendant
be tried without an arbitrary exclusion of
members of his class from the jury. Inclu-
sion or exclusion from juries should not be
based on such accidents as race or religion.
